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LEGISLATION SCHOLARSHIP AND PEDAGOGY IN THE
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Legal academe's approach to the systematic study of "legisla-
tion" resembles Congress' attitude toward balancing the federal
budget: everyone agrees that it is a good thing, but laments that it is
not done. A growing body of opinion bemoans legislation's "second
class" status as an academic discipline and advocates substantially en-
hanced scholarly interest in the subject.' We join this collective la-
ment and endorse a more systematic and creative approach to
teaching and writing about legislation.
The most obvious justification for greater academic attention to
legislation is the twentieth century's "orgy of statute making," which
has transformed our polity into one where law is not only primarily
statutory, but also is increasingly "statutorified." 2 The elective curric-
ulum at most law schools reflects this development by offering special-
ized courses in subjects which revolve around one or more statutes-
taxation, labor law, bankruptcy, sales law, corporate and securities
law, to cite but a few examples. These courses can teach students a
great deal about working with statutes, but they do not approach stat-
utes as a systematic topic of inquiry and do not teach general skills of
dealing with legislatures and their statutory products. For example, a
sales law course typically examines the Uniform Commercial Code
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1. See, eg., Williams, Statutory Law in Legal Education: Still Second Class After All These
Years, 35 MERCER L. REv. 803 (1984). See also R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 336-39 (1985); Grad, Legislation in the Law School, 8 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (1984);
Johnstone, Some Thoughts on Legislation in Legal Education, 35 MERCER L. REv. 845 (1984);
Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800
(1983) [hereinafter Posner, Statutory Interpretation].
2. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 95 (1977); G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
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(UCC) in some detail and explores the rich interrelationships among
the various provisions. As such, this course not only fails to teach
students any general theory for interpreting statutes, but also (stand-
ing alone) may even inadvertently mislead students since few legal
problems involve statutes as nicely integrated as the UCC. In our
view, a better scholarly and pedagogical balance between general the-
ory and particular substantive law is needed. A legislation survey
course should contribute to better student understanding both of the
overall dynamics and theory involved in statutory lawmaking and of
such special statutory subjects as sales law, taxation, and so forth.
Optimally, the legislation course should be "theory-driven" by schol-
arship examining the systemic features of statutory law and
lawmaking.
A more subtle justification for intensified attention to legislation
as an academic discipline is its importance for the central endeavor of
legal education-the teaching of legal reasoning. Reasoning from a
statute is not the same as reasoning from a judicial opinion. A court
spells out a principled basis for its decision while legislatures often
just offer imperative language and little explanation. Law students
must be able to master both types of legal reasoning to become com-
petent attorneys. Yet the first-year law school curriculum, in which
legal reasoning is a major focus, emphasizes courses requiring close
analysis of judicial opinions and typically offers few, if any, courses
requiring similar scrutiny of statutes.3 Furthermore, legal scholarship
abounds with analyses of Supreme Court decisions, but neglects simi-
lar analysis of important enactments of Congress. The implicit
message legal education is sending to law students is that reasoning
from statutes is less important, or less interesting, or less intellectual
than reasoning from judicial decisions. Legislation scholars have
shown, however, that reasoning from statutes involves just as many
challenging issues as reasoning from judicial opinions.4
A final justification for an academic emphasis on statutory stud-
3. The primary "statutory" course--civil procedure, which is dominated by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or an equivalent state code-is usually taught like the common law courses of
torts, contracts, and property, with an emphasis on case law rather than the Rules. Indeed, many
civil procedure teachers pay little attention to the language and interesting history of the Rules.
4. See Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 41 (1937); Landis, Statutes
as Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934); Pound, Common Law and Legislation,
21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908). Cf Moragne v. United States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 377 (1970)
(reasoning from statutory developments to overrule a Supreme Court admiralty precedent); J. MER-
RYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1969) (civil law reasoning from statutes).
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ies is their importance for general theories of law. Scholarly and ped-
agogical attention to the nature of law should be as much
"legisprudential" 5 as "jurisprudential." An ambitious course in legis-
lation will not only give students a greater appreciation for the differ-
ent sources of law and their interrelationships, but also will introduce
students to different philosophies of law -now competing for scholarly
acceptance. It is noteworthy that the current, prevailing "legal pro-
cess" philosophy of law was classically embodied in the teaching
materials compiled by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks (Hart & Sacks)
in the 1950's, which were and remain an excellent introduction to
legislation.6 Today, alternative philosophies of law-including the
law and economics movement, critical studies, and the "new" legal
process-challenge the legal process consensus. This challenge has
particularly important ramifications in the field of legislation. In
short, legislation is where much of the intellectual "action" is in legal
scholarship, and ought to be in legal education.
This Article is largely a dilation of this last point. Inspired by
new developments in the academic study of legislation, law schools
ought to devote more attention to the subject. The old methods of
teaching legislation, derived from the legal process philosophy, are
outdated in several respects; new methods and pedagogical theories
promise to make legislation an increasingly important subject in the
law school curriculum. We hope to be a part of this movement
through the publication in 1987 of our teaching materials entitled
Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy.7 Our primary goal in this
Article is to identify the problems with the legal process methods of
thinking about and teaching legislation, and to suggest some of the
contours of the agenda for legislation scholarship and pedagogy in
this "post-legal process era."
The first part of this Article describes the long-dominant Hart &
Sacks legal process approach to legislation. Legislation as an aca-
5. Julius Cohen coined this term to describe the theoretical study of the legislative (as opposed
to the judicial) aspect of legal philosophy. Cohen, Legisprudence: Problems and.Agenda, 11 Hoe-
STRA L. REv. 1163 (1983); Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950).
6. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). Four of the nine chapters-well over half the materials-
relate to key areas of legisprudential concern: the political process (chapter four), legislatures and
the legislative process (chapter five), the executive branch and the administrative process (chapter
six), and statutory interpretation (chapter seven).
7. We have circulated chapters of W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, STATUTES AND THE CREA-
TION OF PUBLIC POLICY in draft form for the last year. West Publishing Company will publish our
materials in 1987.
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demic discipline will long be indebted to Hart & Sacks, but after
thirty years their approach is no longer persuasive to a growing body
of legal scholars. We examine the post-legal process approaches to
legislation scholarship and teaching in the second and third parts of
this Article. Scholars have significantly expanded the agenda for leg-
islation by reconceptualizing legal doctrine through models and in-
sights from other academic disciplines and by criticizing the
ideological assumptions of the Hart & Sacks approach. Because the
post-legal process theories we describe are still in the process of be-
coming, our description of them will be rather tentative and specula-
tive. Our description does not purport to be comprehensive. We
want to explore some of the provocative new ideas and approaches,
not to set forth a systematic synthesis or assessment. Indeed, the two
of us do not agree on all matters of the new legisprudence. We do
agree, though, that the post-legal process approaches promise to make
legislation one of the most interesting areas of legal academic inquiry
in this generation.
I. LEGAL PROCESS SCHOLARSHIP AND PEDAGOGY
OF LEGISLATION
The 1950's was a great and creative period for legislation schol-
arship and pedagogy. Several new legislation casebooks were pub-
lished, and the legal process materials were developed by Hart &
Sacks at the Harvard Law School.8 The legal process materials were
an ambitious attempt to show how public policy evolves from the in-
teraction of the various branches of government, each branch acting
within the realm of its "institutional competence." The philosophy of
Hart & Sacks' materials reflected the spirit of the legal community in
the 1950's. On the one hand, the legal community had tired of the
corrosive skepticism about legal rules and doctrine preached in the
1920's and 1930's by many of the "legal realists." The anti-formalism
of these realists was met by a yearning in the 1950's for consensus
about the rules of the profession. On the other hand, the profession
also wanted to view itself as reformist and progressive and was willing
to accept the realist critique of many of the old rules and doctrines.
The legal process materials satisfied these antipodal desires by making
three working assumptions that have influenced the direction of legis-
8. We focus on the Hart & Sacks materials because they are such a sophisticated embodiment
of the approach to legislation in the 1950's and, more importantly, because they have been so widely
influential.
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lation scholarship and pedagogy for a generation.9
The first assumption is that all the branches of government act
pursuant to rational purposes which can be discovered from the con-
text of their action. Hart & Sacks believed that "[law is a doing of
something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the ba-
sic problems of social living."10 It is perhaps natural to characterize
judicial decisions as rationally purposive, for judges' written opinions
set forth a reasoned justification, but Hart & Sacks also attributed
rational purposes to the legislature. "Every statute must be conclu-
sively presumed to be a purposive act. The idea of a statute without
an intelligible purpose is foreign to the idea of law and inadmissible,"
posited the materials. 1
This "rationality assumption" was critically important to Hart &
Sacks because it reaffirmed the objectivity, indeed the legitimacy, of
legal rules. Some of the legal realists had mocked the determinacy
and objectivity of formal rules. For example, the realists derided the
reliability of established maxims of statutory interpretation and advo-
cated a more honest confession from judges that they were creating
law as much as implementing it.12 Hart & Sacks recognized the ap-
peal of the realists' anti-formalist, policy-oriented approach, but be-
lieved that the law also needed to have determinate answers in order
for like cases to be treated alike and for people to respect the authority
of law. Their resolution of this dilemma is a brilliant hybrid of deduc-
tive, formalist rules and inductive, anti-formalist policy. Because
"every statute and every doctrine of unwritten law developed by the
decisional process has some kind of purpose or objective," ambiguities
can be intelligently resolved, first, by identifying that.purpose and the
policy or principle it embodies and, then, by deducing the result most
9. Our discussion of these assumptions is based upon our understanding of the Hart & Sacks
materials, for nowhere do the authors set forth all of these assumptions. Hence, our enterprise
involves an element of speculation. We have also benefitted from discussions with Gary Peller, who
has a work in progress which analyzes the Hart & Sacks approach historically and jurisprudentially.
10. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, at 162. See Weisberg, The Calabresian JudicialArtist:
Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 217 (1983) (basic Hart & Sacks idea that
justice results from cooperation of the branches of government to solve a problem).
11. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, at 1156. See id. at 1414-15 (when interpreting a
statute, a court should assume "that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably"); id. at 1200 (similar rule of interpretation).
12. For excellent examples of the realists' skepticism about formal rules of statutory interpreta-
tion, see Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950); Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges
in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 456 (1950); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 863 (1930).
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consonant with that principle or policy. 13
A second legal process assumption is the centrality of procedure.
In the legislative process, the qualities extolled by Hart & Sacks are
(1) an "informed process," in which key decisions are only made after
all relevant information has been collected; (2) a "deliberative pro-
cess," in which decisions are not made until the legislators have fully
discussed the evidence and the policy implications; and (3) an "effi-
cient process" that dispatches all proposed legislation after due con-
sideration and gives deliberative priority to the most important
issues.14 Obviously, similar qualities are critical to the judicial and
administrative processes. Although Hart & Sacks' "proceduralist as-
sumption" conceded to the legal realists that lawyers have no special
expertise in uncovering the best substantive policy, it declared that
lawyers can master the field of procedure. Moreover, an emphasis on
procedure enhances the legitimacy of law. One may debate endlessly
the correctness of a policy judgment, but Hart & Sacks believed that if
the decisionmaker has followed the regularized procedures for formu-
lating that policy, that alone lends the result some degree of
credibility.
A corollary which follows from the proceduralist assumption is
Hart & Sacks' famed "principle of institutional settlement":
Implicit in every such system of procedures is the central ideal of
law-an idea which can be described as the principle of institutional set-
tlement .... The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence is the
establishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision. The
principle of institutional settlement expresses the judgment that decisions
which are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures for
making decisions of this kind ought to be accepted as binding on the
whole society unless and until they are duly changed ....
When the principle of institutional settlement is plainly applicable,
we say that the law "is" thus and so, and brush aside further discussion
of what it "ought" to be. Yet the "is" is not really an "is" but a special
kind of "ought"-a statement that, for the reasons just reviewed, a deci-
sion which is the duly arrived at result of a duly established procedure for
13. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, at 166-67. See id. at 1148-79; Weisberg, supra note
10, at 233-36. Note that Hart & Sacks were somewhat torn between doctrinal and realist approaches
to statutory issues. On the one hand, they were scornful of fast and simple doctrinal answers and
insisted upon a thorough contextual examination to uncover the right answer in hard cases. E.g., H.
HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, at 1149-58. On the other hand, they found that legal rules-
including the oft-lampooned "canons of statutory construction"-yielded determinate and correct
answers in the easy cases and were useful contextual guideposts in the hard cases. See id. at 1221.
14. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, at 715-16. See Ackerman, Book Review, DAEDALUS,
Winter 1974, at 119, 123-24 (reviewing J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)).
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making decisions of that kind "ought" to be accepted as binding upon the
whole society unless or until it has been duly changed. 15
Consequently, although Hart & Sacks were rational and reformist-
the law ought to be applied in an objectively justifiable manner and
ought to be subject to change-their legal process approach in prac-
tice may support the status quo. The fairness or justice of existing
rules and allocations of power requires no continuing defense under
the legal process philosophy; once the "duly established" mechanisms
of government have spoken on a legal issue, its resolution is the
"fight" answer until that resolution is altered through the duly estab-
lished procedures.
A third assumption, not explicit in the legal process materials, is
a political theory assumption underlying the other two. Political the-
ory in the 1950's accepted pluralism as the best description of our
polity. Pluralism posits that government exists to resolve clashes
among conflicting interests; hence, legislation is, in large part, the
political system's accommodation of the demands of the various inter-
est groups. In the 1950's, many influential political theorists believed
that the legislature produced generally good public policy because a
variety of interests (representing a variety of views) would form
around all salient issues and an informed legislature could then make
rational choices. 16 We believe that Hart & Sacks at least implicitly
accepted this "optimistic pluralism assumption." Hart & Sacks were
quite familiar with the leading pluralist texts of their decade, 17 and
their materials concede that "most enactments" of the legislature are
in response to pressure by organized interests.18 But the materials all
but ignore the effect of interest group pressures on the legislative
product and, instead, emphasize the deliberative procedures of legisla-
15. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, at 4-5 (emphasis in original).
16. See, eg., W. BINKLEY & M. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1950); D.
TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). Theodore Lowi has summarized the assump-
tions of what he calls "interest group liberalism": (1) organized interests are homogeneous and easy
to identify; (2) organized interests emerge in every sector of society and adequately represent most of
those sectors, so that one group will protect society against malign policies sought by other groups;
(3) the role of government is to ensure access to all interest groups and to reach compromises accom-
modating the interests of all. T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALIsM 51 (2d ed. 1979).
17. E.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, at 727 (citing W. BINKLEY & M. MOOS, supra
note 16); id. at 739 (citing D. TRUMAN, supra note 16); id. at 747 (citing V. KEY, POLITICS, PAR-
TIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (4th ed. 1958)). See also id. at 736 (statement of pluralist
philosophy).
18. Id. at 829. See also id. at 2 (characterizing some law as responsive to special group de-
mands and some law as responsive to overall needs of the community).
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tion. The suggestion that "the best criterion of sound legislation is the
test of whether it is the product of a sound process of enactment"
epitomizes the Hart & Sacks philosophy.19 Probably inspired in part
by contemporary political theory, they assumed that notwithstanding
the pressure of politics, the legislature is perfectly capable of produc-
ing rational, purposive policies, so long as the legislature follows in-
formed, deliberative, and efficient procedures.
Hart & Sacks were not thoroughgoing pluralists, however, for
they envisioned a significant lawmaking role for courts. (Most plural-
ists, we think, emphasize the legislative process.) Indeed, their mater-
ials overwhelmingly emphasize the methods of judicial lawmaking-
the common law, statutory interpretation, and judicial review-where
a "one-person lobby" can prevail through a reasoned appeal to the
public interest.20 The tension between Hart & Sacks' concessions to
pluralism and their faith in the judicial process generates a central
concern of legal process thought: to legitimate judicial lawmaking.
In a sense, the academic technique and philosophy of the legal process
materials meet that concern in dozens of specific problems and ques-
tions. Hart & Sacks' pluralism is one in which all departments of
government cooperate in the creation of public policy, each depart-
ment acting within its realm of institutional competence. In the rea-
soned pluralism of Hart & Sacks, courts naturally have a significant
role because they apply the law and, hence, have a duty to continue
the deliberative process (reasoned elaboration) by which the law re-
mains purposive and fair.
Hart & Sacks' three assumptions and their academic agenda have
dominated the study of legislation in the last generation. The central
aspiration of the legal process materials-that the law be made as co-
herent and rational as possible through procedural justifications con-
sistent with political pluralism-has, by and large, driven most
legislation scholarship. For example, it is indisputable that the legiti-
macy of judicial review has captured the imagination of scholars since
the 1950's. On the heels of Hart & Sacks, Alexander Bickel in the
early 1960's posed the "countermajoritarian difficulty" with the War-
19. Id. at 715. The materials pose the question: "To what extent should the legislative process
be a rational process, whereby policy and factual information become the basis of carefully reasoned
solutions; and to what extent ought the process rather to reflect the relative strengths of the pressures
of competing interest groups?" Id. at 716. The preferred answer is, we think, apparent from the
question.
20. See id. ch. 3 (common law), ch. 6 (administrative law), ch. 7 (statutory interpretation) and
ch. 9 (remedies for unlawful official action).
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ren Court's judicial activism. 21 Whenever a judge declares a statute
unconstitutional (as the Court did frequently), an unelected official is
overturning a policy adopted by the elected representatives of the peo-
ple. In a pluralist democracy, such a countermajoritarian action re-
quires substantial justification for it to be legitimate. This question
has been the subject of intensive debate for twenty years. The most
celebrated resolutions of the countermajoritarian difficulty, by John
Hart Ely and Jesse Choper, are strikingly consistent with the old Hart
& Sacks assumptions: judicial review is justified to help make the
political process work the way Hart & Sacks assumed it would
work-with all groups given access to the process and no information
suppressed.22
The scholarship relating to statutory interpretation has, simi-
larly, followed the leads suggested by Hart & Sacks. Although the
Supreme Court itself only sometimes adopts the Hart & Sacks as-
sumption about purposive and rational legislative action, commenta-
tors often accept it as established orthodoxy. In fact, virtually all of
the important scholarly commentary defends the legitimacy of inter-
stitial judicial lawmaking through creative statutory interpretation.23
Even more pronounced is the scholarly interest in the use of legisla-
tive history (a portion of Hart & Sacks' contextual evidence) to illumi-
nate the policies and purposes underlying ambiguous statutes.24 A
veritable explosion of scholarship has urged state courts to consult
legislative history.25
21. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962); Kronman, Alexander
Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1573-79 (1985).
22. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). See also M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982), and Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory--And Its Future, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981), for sophisticated analyses of the synthesis of Choper and Ely. See also the
works of Judge Robert Bork, cited infra note 47, which criticize the legitimacy of judicial activism.
23. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); J.
HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES (1982); S. MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed.
1982); Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Inter-
est Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common
Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982).
24. Recent articles, citing much of the earlier work, include Dickerson, Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (1983); Wald, Some Observations
on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195 (1983).
25. See, eg., Allison & Hambleton, Research in Texas Legislative History, 47 Tax. B.J. 314
(1984); Rhodes & Seereiter, The Search for Intent. Aids to Statutory Construction in Florida-An
Update, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 485 (1985); Comment, Legislative History in Washington, 7 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 571 (1984); Comment, Statutory Interpretation in California: Individual
Testimony as an Extrinsic Aid, 15 U.S.F. L. REV. 241 (1981).
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It is striking that most of the legislation scholarship of the last
generation has approached the subject from a judicial standpoint, just
as Hart & Sacks did. The same appears to be true of legislation
pedagogy. A review of current legislation casebooks 26 and of Robert
Williams' recent article surveying the teaching of the subject 27 sug-
gests that most legislation courses are proceduralist and static in ori-
entation, seek purposive coherence in the law, and generate
intellectual discussion around the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking in
a pluralist polity. If the casebooks are any guide, courses in legisla-
tion typically cover the procedures of legislation, the relationship of
statutory law to case law, and the interpretation of statutes by
courts. 28 The course is treated as a congeries of different topics,
united only by the process through which statutes are made and inter-
preted. The orientation of Hart & Sacks' materials still seems to dom-
inate the discipline, even in the classroom.
Perhaps most ironic is that the materials on legislation tend to be
casebooks-mainly collections of cases which deal in some way with
statutes.29 Williams has noted that "[t]he case method, and even the
presentation of statutes in modem cases and materials books, too
often depict statutes only in brief excerpts that have become the focal
point of an individual case."' 30 Judge Richard Posner, who recently
joined the ranks of legislation teachers, has complained that legisla-
tion casebooks devote too much attention to specialized procedural
topics such as reapportionment, which can be taught through interest-
ing Supreme Court cases, and too little attention to political and eco-
nomic theories about legislation, which must be taught through
descriptive analysis. 31
26. 0. HETZEL, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (1980); H. LINDE, G. BUNN, F. PAFF & W.
CHURCH, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES (2d ed. 1981); C. NUTTING & R. DICK-
ERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (5th ed. 1978); H. READ, J. MACDONALD, J.
FORDHAM & W. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (4th ed. 1982).
27. Williams, supra note 1.
28. This generalization is not true ofH. LINDE, G. BUNN, F. PAFF & W. CHURCH, supra note
26. That casebook does not deal with statutory interpretation and focuses mostly upon lawmaking
by administrative agencies and by legislatures.
29. This generalization is somewhat less true of the two more recent sets of materials, 0. HET-
ZEL, supra note 26, and H. LINDE, G. BUNN, F. PAFF & W. CHURCH, supra note 26, than of the
other materials. Our own materials on legislation, W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 7, con-
tain more than a few cases, but we have a higher ratio of text to cases than the other works. It is
interesting that H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, does not slavishly rely on cases and introduces
students to a rich variety of legal materials.
30. Williams, supra note 1, at 827.
31. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 337.
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Such complaints indicate that thoughtful scholars have grown
restive with the classical legal process approach to teaching and writ-
ing about legislation. At the most general level, scholars object to the
tendency of legislation casebooks to lack any "integrating force either
of peda[g]ogical purpose or intellectual structure" and to their "fail-
ure to conceive of 'legislation' as the study of legislatures as lawmak-
ing institutions. '32 As an academic discipline, legislation needs to
develop, first, an identity and, then, comprehensive theories that ex-
plain the practical, constitutional, and institutional role of legislative
law. More specifically, some legal scholars have questioned the as-
sumptions of the classical legal process approach, frequently by im-
porting insights from other disciplines (especially public choice
theory, political philosophy, and literary theory). This scholarship
suggests that there may no longer be an academic consensus in favor
of the various legal process assumptions. As the underlying assump-
tions are questioned or analyzed in different ways, novel and more
systematic approaches to legislation are emerging among scholars.
The remainder of this Article is devoted to these exciting new
developments, for they affect both the scholarship dealing with legis-
lation and the teaching of the subject. We start with the academic
critiques of the legal process approach, which question the very struc-
ture of that approach to legislation and suggest different intellectual
frameworks for thinking about the subject. Our materials on legisla-
tion draw upon these new approaches and offer students and profes-
sors at least two competing visions of the discipline.33 We conclude
this Article with some of the more practical innovations in teaching
the subject which are suggested by the new academic approaches and
the collective experience of legislation professors in the last decade.
II. POST-LEGAL PROCESS LEGISLATION SCHOLARSHIP
The assumptions of institutional rationality, proceduralism, and
optimistic pluralism that lie at the heart of the traditional legal pro-
32. Stewart, Book Review, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 550, 552 (1974). Within the severe limita-
tions of a "study aid" format, Professor Jack Davies, a former state senator, has made substantial
effort to address some of the concerns noted by Stewart. See J. DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1986).
33. We attempt in W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 7, to introduce students in the
early chapters to the economic theory of legislation (in which statutes are viewed as essentially deals
between legislators and interest groups) and the public values theory of legislation (in which statutes
are viewed as constitutive, public-seeking actions by the body politic). Throughout the materials, we
suggest how different legal and constitutional issues might be approached by each theory.
1987]
HeinOnline  -- 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 701 1986-1987
702 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
cess view of legislation have been subjected to strong critique in the
last decade and can no longer be considered uncontroversial (as they
arguably were in the 1950's). On the one hand, law and economics
scholars have challenged the traditional legal process assumption that
legislatures act in a purposive way to create balanced public policy
and have questioned the legitimacy of the degree of judicial lawmak-
ing contemplated by legal process theory. Law and economics schol-
ars view legislation as the product of political, often unfair,
compromises which, nonetheless, must be enforced by courts. On the
other hand, critical scholars have challenged the traditional legal pro-
cess assumptions that even judge-made law is rational and objective
and that procedures should be legitimating devices. 34 Many critical
scholars, like many law and economics scholars, find legislation polit-
ical and, hence, potentially unfair. Unlike most law and economics
scholars, however, critical scholars conclude that such law is illegiti-
mate and unworthy.
These and other critiques have disturbed legal process thinkers
who strive for rational justice and progressive law reform. The re-
sponse of what Robert Weisberg calls the "new legal process" 35
school of legal scholars has been to urge an increasingly activist role
for courts and agencies to articulate and enforce modem "public val-
ues" (some prefer "common values") in our legal system. The new
legal process scholars focus on the traditional legal process topics, but
move beyond the traditional legal process assumptions of legislative
rationality, proceduralism, and optimistic pluralism to advocate an
anti-pluralist vision of governmental legitimacy based on a dialectic of
social justice.
A. Law and Economics Legisprudence
The Hart & Sacks vision of legislation is grounded in the belief
that reasonable people acting according to regular procedures will
reach a purposive, reasonable result. For the legal community in the
1950's, this belief was largely untested. Today, an impressive body of
34. Unlike law and economics scholars, critical scholars have not written much that is specifi-
cally aimed at legislation as an academic discipline, but we think their primary insights about legal
rules and reasoning are applicable to legislation as well. (Perhaps, too, some critical scholars might
sensibly observe that the categorization of academic disciplines into pigeonholes only beclouds un-
derstanding.) While we do not pretend to be experts in the impressive conceptual body of critical
legal literature, we believe that our enterprise in this Article would be seriously unbalanced without
a sensitive discussion of some of the principal lines of critical thought.
35. See generally Weisberg, supra note 10.
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"public choice" scholarship undermines this optimistic pluralism as-
sumption. Public choice scholarship applies principles of market eco-
nomics to explain institutional and political behavior and
decisionmaking.3 6 The public choice approach assumes that people
are "egoistic, rational utility maximizers" in political as weli as eco-
nomic arenas. 37 Under the public choice vision of legislation, many, if
not most, important public problems are not resolved by the legisla-
ture. Even when the legislature does act on an important issue, the
resulting statute "tends to represent compromise because the process
of accommodating conflicts of group interest is one of deliberation
and consent.... What may be called public policy is the equilibrium
reached in [the political] struggle at any given moment. ' 38 The legis-
lature is a political battlefield; most of its activity is no more purposive
than the expedient accommodation of special interest pressures. "It is
hard to imagine a more effective way of saying that Congress has no
mind or force of its own" than the prognosis of public choice theory. 39
Judge Richard Posner has been the scholar most responsible for
introducing this rich body of economic literature to the legal profes-
sion and developing a legisprudence based on it. Although he has not
yet published a complete theory on the subject, we gather from Judge
Posner's writings and his legislation course at the University of Chi-
cago that his theory would look something like the following
account.40
36. Leading public choice works include J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT (1966); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982); Becker, A Theory
of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. So. 3 (1971). The public choice literature is
surveyed and updated in Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. -
(forthcoming 1987); J. Mashaw, Positive Theory and Public Law (Feb. 1986) (Rosenthal Lectures,
available at Northwestern Univ. Law School).
37. D. MUELLER, supra note 36, at 1.
38. E. LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS 35-36 (1952). Professor Latham's book was
an early exponent of 1950's pluralism, which grew out of political science, rather than political
economics, and thus predated most public choice scholarship. Although the quotation in the text
represents a foundational insight for both public choice and pluralist theory, we recognize that these
approaches have descriptive and normative differences. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 36.
39. E. SCHATSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA 37 (1960).
40. The next several paragraphs are our "imaginative reconstruction" of Judge Posner's theory
of legisprudence based upon R. POSNER, supra note 1; Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism and
the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986-87) [herein-
after Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism]; Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1; Pos-
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Although public choice legisprudence starts with the assumption
that people will behave in their rational self-interest, Judge Posner is
willing to assume that people do not always act as rational self-maxi-
mizers-for example, because participants in the political process
may gauge their self-interest on incomplete information, and because
sometimes political actors will behave ideologically or altruistically.
He also assumes that democracy, government by majoritarian choice,
is the preferred form of government. The first question is: why not
make all of our political choices by a direct vote of the citizenry (di-
rect democracy)? At least three problems inhere with such a govern-
ment: (1) high transaction costs associated with obtaining agreement
of so many people; (2) failure to register voters' "intensity" of prefer-
ence; and (3) the danger of bad decisions because participants will
generally be poorly informed and temporary and arbitrary majorities
might assemble. The second and third problems can be alleviated by
requiring unanimity or a supermajority to make policy, but that
greatly increases the magnitude of the first problem.
Because of these problems with direct democracy, a sizeable de-
mocracy will adopt a "representative" form of government. The
problems of high transaction costs, poor information, and intensity of
preferences can be greatly ameliorated in the legislature by the use of
specialized subgroups, especially committees. The danger of tempo-
rary majorities enacting short-sighted laws can be reduced by estab-
lishing procedural hurdles to legislation- for example, by including
requirements that two different legislative chambers and an executive
officer approve a proposal before it becomes a law, that determined
minorities can obstruct proposals that are very harmful to them (e.g.,
by filibusters or opposition in committee), and that an independent
judiciary may strike down unconstitutional laws and mitigate harsh
laws by interpreting them to render them less oppressive.
In this construct, the operation of the legislature resembles a
market, in which statutes are deals between buyers and sellers and,
hence, are governed by supply and demand market forces.41 The de-
mand pattern in this market is determined by the degree and nature of
ner, Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263
(1982); Posner & Landes, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 875 (1975); R. Posner, Outline of Rational Model of Legislative Process (Spring 1986) (hand-
out in Judge Posner's course on Legislative Process).
41. The following discussion draws heavily on M. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A
THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS (1981); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965);
J. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973), as well as the sources cited supra notes 36 & 40.
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interest group organization and activity, which itself is determined by
the perceived incidence of costs and benefits of potential legislation.
For example, widely distributed benefits, such as the protection af-
forded all of us by criminal laws, do not normally stimulate the crea-
tion of interest groups in favor of such legislation because each
beneficiary has only a small stake in the benefit and, consequently,
will not bestir herself to invest any time, money, or energy to obtain
the benefit. Those who do seek such legislation will be subject to the
"free rider problem." Because the benefits of "public goods," such as
safety from crime, cannot be restricted to the group promoting them,
each person has an incentive to "free ride" on the efforts of others.
Accordingly, groups will tend not to form around the issue, and legis-
lation usually will not be demanded. For similar reasons, legislation
with widely distributed costs (such as an incremental increase in taxes
or the rate of inflation) will not systematically stimulate group forma-
tion to oppose such legislation. In contrast, the existence of concen-
trated benefits or costs-subsidies or taxes falling upon a smaller and
well-defined group of actors-will tend to stimulate interest group
formation because each beneficiary or cost payer has a substantial
stake in the outcome and has both incentive and opportunity to coor-
dinate her efforts with those similarly situated.
The supply pattern in the legislation market is determined by the
costs and benefits of different types of legislation to legislators. Public
choice theory assumes that the primary motivation of the legislator is
to be re-elected. Because people tend to remember the ways one has
hurt them rather than the good things one does for them, the favors a
legislator does for a group count less than the harms to which the
legislator contributes. Therefore, the last thing a legislator wants to
do is anger important interest groups. In public choice argot, the leg-
islator prefers "nonconflictual" demand patterns in which there is
substantial consensus among interested persons and groups. Thus,
the legislator will want to do nothing if opposition to legislation is
organized (as in concentrated-cost laws), but will be willing to grant
subsidies to organized groups paid out of general revenues (concen-
trated-benefit laws) when the general public is largely unaware of
what is happening. Unhappily, the legislator cannot always avoid
conflictual demand patterns, either because an issue is politically sali-
ent or organized groups are on both sides. In that event, the legislator
has every incentive to work out some compromise statute that satisfies
19871
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as many interest groups as possible, or even to delegate the sensitive
decisions to agencies.
As a result of these supply and demand forces, the legislature will
pass -a great many statutes which serve little more than the interests of
powerful and well-organized interest groups. For the same reasons,
fewer "public interest" laws will be passed, namely, those laws cor-
recting market failures (supplying public goods), responding to
broadly accepted concepts of distributive justice (e.g., civil rights
laws), or articulating some public sentiment (e.g., laws against
obscenity).
This descriptive feature of Judge Posner's legisprudence is a co-
herent conceptualization of legislation.42 It is also an important
countervision to Hart & Sacks' idealized vision of legislation as a
product of rational and purposive activity. Legislators do indeed act
in purposive ways, but the purposes are most often self-interested
rather than public-interested ones, one might argue from public
choice theory. The consequences of accepting such a countervision
are significant. Once one believes that the legislature does not typi-
cally create law for the public good, one becomes much more inter-
ested in structural reform in the existing system (e.g., a constitutional
amendment to balance the budget) and alternative forms of
majoritarian lawmaking (e.g., direct democracy). Legislative proce-
dures take on fresh meaning as opportunities for manipulation and
strategic behavior instead of opportunities for deliberation and infor-
mation collection. The patterns of statute creation become more in-
teresting for the legal scholar. How pervasive is the influence of
interest groups, and when do they form? What is their effect on the
legislative agenda? These topics are unique to the study of legislation
and have been slighted by legal process scholarship. One role for leg-
islation scholarship in the post-legal process era is to explore these
subjects under more realistic assumptions than those of traditional
legal process theory.43
By challenging the Hart & Sacks rationality and optimistic plu-
ralism assumptions, Judge Posner has suggested a greatly expanded
42. Most law and economics scholars would probably accept this description as accurate,
though some (probably including Judge Posner) feel as we do that substantial caution should be
exercised in informing legal theory by the use of public choice models that are not yet completely
tested. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. - (forthcoming 1987);
Farber & Frickey, supra note 36.
43. Legal scholars are beginning to explore these issues. See Romano, The Political Economy
of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987).
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agenda for legislation scholarship. This is not Judge Posner's only
contribution, nor his only disagreement with Hart & Sacks' vision of
legislation. Hart & Sacks conceptualized legislation as part of a grand
legal process which produces rational, coherent law; judicial elabora-
tion and review of legislation is just another part of the grand process.
Once the rationality of statutory law is deflated, though, the rational
judicial process becomes more vulnerable to the countermajoritarian
difficulty. If the lawmaking enterprise itself is arational and incoher-
ent, judicial activism in the name of rationality and coherence be-
comes increasingly problematic. Legal process theorists might
respond that a realistic view of the legislative process ought to make
us more willing to accept judicial activism, so that more coherence
and rationality can be made out of the law. Judge Posner criticizes
such judicial activism as inconsistent with a more pessimistic
pluralism.
At least implicitly in his publications, Judge Posner raises nor-
mative or constitutional questions which strike at the heart of the
legal process justifications for judicial activism. 44 By reading judi-
cially created rational purposes into statutes, which for the most part
are political compromises, are courts not transgressing their constitu-
tional role in our polity? By asserting broad power to declare statutes
infringing on certain "fundamental" rights unconstitutional, are
courts not simply substituting their political preferences for those of
the majoritarian legislature? However "superior" judicial rationality
might be, suggests Judge Posner, the role of courts is to give effect to
the political compromises found in statutes. In most instances, courts
should be "agents" charged with enforcing the bargains reached be-
tween the legislature and interest groups. While agents often must
interpret their instructions creatively to meet new circumstances,
their role-the judge's role-is clearly a subordinate one in our
government. 45
Such a constitutional approach, which is at least implicit in most
of Judge Posner's legisprudential writings, is rooted in a pessimistic
pluralism quite at odds with the optimism of Hart & Sacks. Accord-
ing to this pessimistic view, a pluralist society will generate an inevita-
44. We are mainly thinking of Posner & Landes, supra note 40. We acknowledge that Judge
Posner's constitutional assumptions have evolved since the publication of that article in 1975. See R.
POSNER, supra note 1.
45. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, supra note 40, suggests that judges are like mili-
tary field commanders: their main role is to implement orders from those in overall command, but
that subordinate role still entails a good deal of judgment and creative thinking.
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ble process of nonrational decisionmaking, due to pressure group
activity, strategic behavior by groups and legislators, and agenda ma-
nipulation. But this pessimist still prefers the ills of pluralism over a
system with more rational social choices, because a pluralist political
system fosters stability and moderation and distributes political satis-
faction broadly. 46 This "pessimistic pluralism assumption" militates
against an active judiciary that would disrupt the deals made by inter-
est groups and legislators by declaring them unconstitutional, for such
activism threatens to reduce overall satisfaction with the political
game.47
For similar reasons, Judge Posner is uncomfortable with Hart &
Sacks' approach to statutory interpretation. Because many statutes
do not really have a public-interested purpose (or do have a complex
array of different and not entirely consistent purposes), Hart & Sacks'
approach of "attributing" purposes to statutes is often nothing more
than imposing judicial values in the place of legislative ones, thus
again disrupting the orderly working of the political system. To as-
sure the stability of the system, Judge Posner urges that courts should
"imaginatively reconstruct" the probable intent of the enacting legis-
lature in most, but not all, cases of statutory interpretation.48
Although similar approaches have been discussed by scholars and
judges in the past,49 Judge Posner has brought fresh theoretical in-
sight to the topic.
Other law and economics theorists disagree with Judge Posner's
theory of constitutional law and statutory interpretation. Much of the
disagreement can be traced to different political theory assumptions.
Some law and economics scholars accept the descriptive features of
public choice theory but have normative objections to the policy con-
sequences of unrestrained pluralist government. Thus, Richard Ep-
46. For an interesting recent explanation of this pessimistic pluralism, see Miller, Pluralism
and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 734 (1983).
47. Thus, most lav and economics scholars probably agree, at least in large part, with Judge
Bork's restrictive approach to judicial review. See Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights
in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
48. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 286-93. Judge Posner's approach is a moderate and flexi-
ble one, for he favors judicial lawmaking when the enacting legislature has no identifiable intent or
when the legislature has implicitly delegated expansive authority to courts to fill in statutory gaps.
His recent article, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, supra note 40, insightfully explores the consid-
erable lawmaking discretion courts have under his theory.
49. Among the sources for this method cited in R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 287 n.64, are
Judge Learned Hand, Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, and William Blackstone.
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stein vigorously argues for expansive judicial review of economic
legislation to correct the tendency of government to expropriate pri-
vate goods and pass rent-seeking laws.5 0 Epstein grounds his argu-
ment on normative and constitutional objections to special interest
laws. His overall political vision is a laissez-faire polity in which most
clashes of interest are resolved in the private sector. Somewhat simi-
larly, Judge Frank Easterbrook argues that statutes must be inter-
preted very narrowly: unless an issue is "expressly" resolved on the
face of the statute, the statute is simply irrelevant to resolution of the
issue5 1
Still other law and economics scholars reject the normative con-
sequences of public choice behavior but nonetheless favor an activist
government, in which political action does contribute to an overall
public good. For example, Jonathan Macey argues that Hart &
Sacks' purpose-of-the-statute approach to statutory interpretation is
supported, rather than undermined, by public choice theory-if one
views the Constitution as creating an activist government which
makes rational political decisions.52 For similar reasons, one of us
argues that public choice theory supports a "dynamic" approach to
statutory interpretation, based upon current facts and policies as well
as original legislative expectations, when circumstances have materi-
ally changed since the statute's enactment.53
While the normative consequences of Judge Posner's economic
legisprudence have stimulated intense scholarly debate, his legis-
prudence has already accomplished three remarkable and positive
things. First, it has laid the descriptive groundwork for an alternative
vision of the legislative process and has generated a constructive de-
bate over the validity of certain assumptions made by traditional legal
process theory. Additionally, it has raised political theory questions
that may redefine the agenda of legisprudence. For example, the pes-
simistic pluralism apparently accepted by Judge Posner would suggest
that legal process scholars have relied too much on courts to make
50. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1985); Ep-
stein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 711-15 (1984). Ep-
stein has a work in progress on the Commerce Clause in which he argues for a narrower
interpretation of affirmative federal power under that provision.
51. See Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983).
52. See Macey, supra note 23.
53. See Eskridge, supra note 42. See also Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, pt. 11(C)
(draft Feb. 1987) (arguing that public choice theory supports a more flexible approach to stare deci-
sis of statutory precedents than that now followed by the Supreme Court).
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policy or to "correct" the policy choices made by the legislature. Per-
haps Judge Posner's most important contribution to legisprudence is
his insistence that the unique features of the legislative process and
statutes be given more academic attention and that statutory law, and
its concomitant political compromises, be treated with more deference
by other branches of government.
B. Critical Legisprudence
Just as law and economics scholars have drawn upon extralegal
public choice scholarship to criticize Hart & Sacks' legal process ap-
proach, "critical scholars" 54 have drawn upon extralegal scholarship
in the fields of philosophy, literary criticism, and leftist political the-
ory. Critical scholars especially concentrate on challenging the legiti-
macy of law. The concern that law be considered legitimate is central
to Hart & Sacks' legal process approach. The claim to legitimacy is
based in part on the rationality assumption-the various participants
in the legal process address the law in a fair and impartial manner and
solve new problems by a rational and fair expansion of existing policy.
The proceduralist assumption complements the rationality assump-
tion as a basis for the law's legitimacy. Hart & Sacks appeared confi-
dent that if regular procedures are followed the resulting policy would
not only be legitimate, but ordinarily rational ("good") as well. Hart
& Sacks' vision of a well-ordered, objective, rational legal process was
shattered for many intellectuals by the developments of the 1960's,
and, in the late 1970's, they began to build a strong radical case
against both the rationality and proceduralist assumptions.
Hart & Sacks implicitly claimed that all law, legislative as well as
judicial, is (or can be) rational, objective, and neutral. Law and eco-
nomics scholars assert a dichotomy between rational, objective, neu-
tral judge-made law (at least if judges act appropriately) and
arational, subjective, political legislature-made law. Many critical
scholars, in turn, claim that all law, legislative as well as judicial, is
ultimately arational, subjective, and political-and therefore not legit-
imate under the legal process assumptions. At the most general level,
Roberto Unger and Mark Tushnet contend that the whole "rule of
law" idea exposes the ideological inconsistency within liberal, plural-
54. We use this term to include members of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement
founded in the late 1970's, feminist scholars (many of whom are members of CLS), and unaffiliated
leftist critics of the modem legal culture.
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ist society.55 In a pluralist society whose members have conflicting
desires, a rule of law cannot really be neutral (i.e., avoid making sub-
stantive value choices), for a neutral rule of law could not resolve the
conflicts among the various interests in society. Yet, once one admits
that the rule of law is not neutral, one admits that law subordinates
the wills of some citizens to the wills of others-which is in tension
with the liberal assumption that the will of some cannot be preferred
over that of others. The purported "rule of law" is incoherent; it is a
reified convention to obscure the domination of society by elite inter-
ests (those whose wills are systematically preferred under the "rule of
law").
Tushnet and Paul Brest argue that a similar incoherence is at the
root of legal process constitutional scholarship. 56 The central di-
lemma in our constitutional system arises from the fact that on most
issues the polity is committed both to majority rule and to the protec-
tion of minority rights. The dilemma is that there is no neutral way to
draw the line between majority rule and minority rights. These criti-
cal scholars deploy this dilemma to deflate traditional legal process
justifications for countermajoritarian judicial review of statutes. A
central point of their scholarship is that judicial review itself is essen-
tially a political issue and cannot be neutrally defended. Richard
Parker flips the dilemma explored by Brest and Tushnet and posits
that there is no neutral justification for deference to the will of the
legislature, either.57 The traditional justification for deference is that
the elected legislature represents the majority will better than the
nonelected judiciary, but Parker questions the factual basis for this
justification. He argues that the vast majority of the electorate is ut-
terly passive and that, to the extent they express political preferences,
those preferences are so conditioned by their relative ignorance and
inequality as to be meaningless. Under these circumstances, what
compelling reason is there for courts, or anybody, to defer to legisla-
tive policies?
Many critical scholars claim that law is political and contingent;
the rules laid down by the legal process could be entirely different if
55. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of
Town: The Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
56. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Norma-
tive Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Tushnet, supra note 55; Tushnet, Truth,
Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation ofPublic Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57
TEx. L. REV. 1307 (1979).
57. See Parker, supra note 22, at 239-57.
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different political values were held by those in power. Even legal rea-
soning is typically nothing more than window-dressing for political
choices. For example, Duncan Kennedy's article on "form and sub-
stance" demonstrates how conventional (supposedly objective and ra-
tional) legal argumentation arbitrarily conflates and alternates
between principles of liberalism (individualism) and altruism (collec-
tivism). 58 The traditional legal process answer to such attacks has
been that whatever political choices are made by the legal process are
at least made openly and according to accepted procedures to which
everyone has adequate access. Critical scholars respond that such
proceduralism is not only misleading, but reactionary. Thus, Parker
attacks the proceduralism inherent in legal process theory. Process
theory, Parker argues, is structurally biased: it fallaciously assumes
that formal access to the political process usually entails meaningful
access (which makes it incorrect), and it diverts attention away from
malign power structures and inequality in society (which makes it
evil). 59 The mythology of societal consent perpetuated by process the-
ory obfuscates the urgency of law reform and pacifies the victims of
oppression.
Gary Peller, another critical scholar, argues that the legitimacy
which Hart & Sacks believed would flow from the rationality and
proceduralist assumptions is a false and oppressive legitimacy. In-
spired by post-structuralist literary theory, Peller has developed the
"law is nothing but politics" critique of legal process theory in partic-
ularly radical directions. 60 Peller argues from the contingency of all
linguistic constructs that any formulation of rules involves political
choices and potential political oppression. As an example of the
power of language to create a false consciousness, Peller deconstructs
the central tenet of legal process formalism-the principle of institu-
tional settlement, the notion that "regularized and peaceable methods
of decision" must be scrupulously followed in order to avoid "disinte-
grating resort to violence."' 61 This principle traditionally has been ac-
58. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976). See also Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209
(1979).
59. See Parker, supra note 22, at 249-57.
60. See Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1152 (1985). For back-
ground on post-structuralist theory, see H. BLOOM, J. DERRIDA, G. HARTMAN & H. MILLER,
DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM (1979); J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION (1982).
61. See Peller, supra note 60, at 1183-87 (deconstructing the principle of institutional settle-
ment, quoted supra in text accompanying note 15).
[Vol. 48:691
HeinOnline  -- 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 712 1986-1987
LEGISLATION SCHOLARSHIP AND PEDAGOGY
cepted as noncontroversial because of its creation of two
dichotomies-peace versus violence and order versus disorder-and
its association of peace with order. The principle, observes Peller,
"not only asks the reader to prefer peace to violence, the aspect of the
principle which establishes its appeal, but further asks the reader to
associate violence with disorder and peace with order," which does
not logically follow. 62 That is, peace and order are not necessarily
connected. Disorderly but nonviolent protests against the War in
Vietnam subserved the cause of peace, while the orderly obedience of
thousands of Americans to the morally bankrupt consequences of the
legal process contributed to violence. Disorderly but nonviolent pro-
tests against racism contributed to the disruption of violent but or-
derly oppression of blacks in the South. The resonance of Peller's
indictment of legal process formalism flows from the reverberations of
the 1960's-from the lunch counter sit-ins of 1961 to the Watergate
denouement in 1974.
Like law and economics scholars, critical scholars have made sig-
nificant and insightful criticisms of traditional legal process assump-
tions. Indeed, their criticisms are more fundamental than those of
law and economics scholars and dramatically raise the stakes of the
legisprudential debate. But unlike law and economics scholars, criti-
cal scholars have not discussed affirmative visions of legisprudence
very much. If their criticisms were accepted, what would be the con-
sequences for legisprudence? We do not know, but we can identify
three important effects that critical thought might have on legislation
scholarship.
First, like Judge Posner, critical scholars seek to expand the
agenda of legislation scholarship beyond the traditional topics of judi-
cial review and statutory interpretation. Thus, critical studies suggest
that the desirability of a representative democracy and the proper
concept of representation, which have received virtually no attention
from legal scholars, ought to be central issues. If one accepts the criti-
cal scholars' argument that all legal standards are essentially subjec-
tive and political choices, it is important to focus on who makes the
political decisions. Many of the inadequacies of the current legal or-
der may be attributable to political decisionmaking by a very narrow
elite group.63 For example, critical scrutiny of the law of rape sug-
62. Id. at 1184.
63. See Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982). See also P. BACH-
RACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE (1980).
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gests that its many differences from other crimes cannot be explained
by reference to rational and objective criteria. They can best be ex-
plained as the reification of male-generated sexual stereotypes.64 The
rules of rape law are not the rules which would have been created by a
community of women and men more sensitive to the degradation of
the various forms of sexual oppression.
If our representative democracy has created and perpetuated in-
adequate laws in part because of the structures of representation, how
can those malign structures be changed? Critical scholars might ex-
plore the possibilities and limitations of direct popular lawmaking in
response to such a question. Or they might advocate novel ap-
proaches to the concept of "representation" in our democracy:
should the old idea that the legislature be a "microcosm" of society be
revived, 65 or should certain groups in the legislature be proportionally
represented? 66 Or critical scholars might call for a genuine reconsti-
tution of our society to encourage broader citizen participation in the
community's public discourse.6 7 Do lawyers have a constructive role
in alerting the community to political problems and rousing people
from passivity? What strategies might be useful in organizing the dis-
possessed and the public to demand more just law?
Second, the work of critical scholars ought to impel some re-
thinking of existing legislation doctrine.6 8 Several critical scholars
have argued that judicial review is essentially a political mechanism
and, hence, ought to be utilized in progressive ways. 69 Critical re-
thinking of judicial review does not necessarily mean more active re-
64. Thus, "nontraditional" rape, in which sexual relations are coerced but the woman does not
physically (and often with great danger to herself) resist, is very frequently not punished. That
occurs, not because the defendant's conduct is in any defensible sense not criminal, but because
legislatures and courts are decisively influenced by stereotypes: "normal" sex involves male aggres-
sion and mild female resistance, so "criminal" sex must involve a lot more resistance, namely, the
harsh physical resistance one boy would use in fighting off another boy in the playground. Estrich,
Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1105, 1128-32 (1986). See also Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Cri-
tique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV. 387 (1984).
65. Cf. Letter from John Adams to John Penn, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 205 (1850).
66. See Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163
(1984).
67. See Brest, supra note 56; Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057
(1980).
68. We readily admit that many critical scholars, especially those who are members of CLS,
are powerfully anti-doctrinal. But that position itself may exert a gravitational pull on future
shapers of doctrine, just as the most negativist legal realists influenced the positive theories of their
colleagues.
69. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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view, however. For example, Jeff Blum argues that the Supreme
Court should relax its strict scrutiny of laws regulating campaign fi-
nance, because first amendment values are implicated on both sides of
the issue: the value of more expression cuts against such legislation,
but the value of equality of political access cuts in favor of it.7o
Although critical scholars have not written much on statutory
interpretation, their general works suggest that statutory interpreta-
tion be reconceptualized. Unger's deconstruction of the polity created
by classical liberalism argues that both the nineteenth century formal-
ist theory of adjudication and Hart & Sacks' purposive theory of adju-
dication are incoherent under liberal assumptions. 71 Both formalism
and purposivism make false claims to legitimacy, for both pretend to
yield rules which permit statutory interpretation to proceed in a neu-
tral and predictable manner, while the very process of deciding a
case-with real parties and equities affecting the judgment-under-
mines that aspiration to neutrality and generality. All of the various
doctrines of statutory interpretation, Unger suggests, only mask liber-
alism's incoherent oscillation between the pretense of neutrality and
equal treatment and the desire to do justice in individual cases. 72 A
sensitive reading of the critical literature leaves one with profound
skepticism about the validity of any of the prevailing approaches to
statutory interpretation.
In place of existing theories of statutory interpretation, some crit-
ical scholars might advocate an "anti-theory": interpreting statutes is
just as political a process as enacting them.73 There is no greater
political justification for an interpretation in any given case beyond
the social justice of that result. Hence, the question whether affirma-
70. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of
Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1273 (1983). See also Wright, Money
and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM.
L. REv. 609 (1982).
71. R. UNGER, supra note 55, at 92-97.
72. Indeed, the history of Anglo-American statutory interpretation reveals a cyclical alterna-
tion between doctrinal rules that promise objectivity and certainty and equitable rules that promise
justice and flexibility. See Blatt, A History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Sub-
stance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 801-02,passim (1985) (as the title indicates, an historical approach
to statutory interpretation influenced by Duncan Kennedy's work).
73. See Hutchinson & Morgan, The Semiology of Statutes (Book Review), 21 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 583, 593-95 (1984) (reviewing D. MIERS & A. PAGE, LEGISLAION (1982)); Hutchinson &
Morgan, Calabresian Sunset: Statutes in the Shade (Book Review), 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1761-
64 (1982) (reviewing G. CALABRESI, supra note 2) [hereinafter Hutchinson & Morgan, Calabresian
Sunset]. See also Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850
(1985).
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tive action is permissible under the civil rights laws or the Constitu-
tion could not be answered by a false objectivism. Rather, the answer
to the interpretive questions arises out of the moral and consequen-
tialist arguments about the justice of affirmative action. Nineteenth
century French jurist Frangois G6ny advocated a method of "free in-
terpretation" to arrive at a just result.74 Under free interpretation, the
judge engages in a broad inquiry into the discussions surrounding the
statute, moral philosophy, and even personal ethics in order to decide
a case. If one accepts anything like the deconstructionists' theory of
language, as Peller and other critical scholars do, even the language of
the statute ought not prevent the judge from engaging in this sort of
free-from-form inquiry.
Third, and most important, critical scholarship should challenge
lawyers to rethink the underlying political assumptions of our legis-
prudence. Hart & Sacks and the law and economics scholars basically
accept the precepts of pluralism (government exists to ensure societal
peace and stability) and liberalism (with its focus on the self-con-
tained individual). Critical scholars have challenged this vision of our
polity in many different ways. For example, they reject the liberal
vision of what human beings are like. People are neither self-con-
tained nor rational maximizers, nor are their "interests" simplistically
materialist and exogenously defined. Instead, people are animated by
a congeries of nonrational desires. Their "interests" are social as well
as personal; indeed, it may be impossible to define a person's ends as
self-contained, because people are strongly influenced by their social
and historical context. 75 Given the focus on community -and social
goods, critical scholarship suggests strongly that attitudes and values
are subject to change through politics. Much of the critical agenda
employs this positive vision of government to alert society to trans-
form its inhuman modes of oppression and anomie.
While critical scholars indict the current rule of law ideology and
the elitist structures it shields, they have an equally strong positive
message. Law and politics (synonymous for many critical scholars)
can help create community just as it can destroy community. This
entails a redefinition of what "law" is "for." Joseph Singer, for exam-
74. See F. GfNY, MTHODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVt POSITIF (1899)
(2 volumes). We are informed that Roberto Unger's forthcoming legal treatise will explore an ap-
proach to statutory interpretation that is very open-ended.
75. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Regan, Community
and Justice in Constitutional Theory, 1985 Wls. L. REV. 1073.
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ple, argues that the goal of legal theory should not be determinacy,
objectivity, or certainty (the legal process, pluralist hallmarks of stat-
utory law), but rather should be "edification. ' 76 Singer assumes that
the law is pulled toward formalism and its concomitant certainty to
ensure that society knows what the law is. Uncertainty about what
exactly the law is will leave us without fair means of regulating pri-
vate conflicts, or even of knowing how to behave, and will encourage
predatory conduct by the government and private power centers.
Singer contends that legal rules do not protect us against these hor-
ribles and that, in truth, the main value of legal rules is constitutive:
the formulation of rules is how we create and express shared values.
Singer and perhaps other critical scholars envision the role of the law-
yer as a facilitator of community-wide discourse which generates val-
ues over time.
C. The Legisprudence of the New Legal Process
Today, although many legal scholars are profoundly unhappy
with the vulnerability of Hart & Sacks' assumptions to the challenges
of the law and economics and critical scholars, many remain commit-
ted to the ideal of a legal process that seeks law reform and justice.
These progressive scholars have responded to the challenge in a vari-
ety of ways; the directions they have taken have created a "new" legal
process which self-consciously pursues substantive as well as proce-
dural justice.77 Although responses to the attacks on legal process
vary greatly, they have several common themes. One is anti-pluralist:
legislation must be more than the accommodation of exogenously de-
fined interests; lawmaking is a process of value creation that should be
informed by theories of justice and fairness. Another theme is that
legislation too often fails to achieve this aspiration, and, thus, creative
lawmaking by courts and agencies is needed to ensure rationality and
justice in law. A final theme is the importance of dialogue or conver-
sation as the means by which innovative judicial lawmaking can be
validated in a democratic polity and by which the rule of law can best
be defended against charges of unfairness or illegitimacy.
Many of the new legal process scholars reject pluralism as the
underlying political theory of our representative democracy. Scholars
76. See Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism & Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
77. Much of the discussion of the new legal process in this Section is indebted to conversations
with Cass Sunstein and Robert Weisberg, and to Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional
Theory, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1502 (1985), and Weisberg, supra note 10.
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have questioned pluralism both historically and normatively. Bruce
Ackerman argues that the Constitution itself does not assume the sim-
ple pluralism of traditional legal process and law and economics the-
ory.78 While the Framers were aware of the inevitability of "factions"
(interest groups), they sought to design a government controlled by
the legislative representatives, rather than by such factions. A central
insight of Ackerman's essay is its recognition of two political tradi-
tions in United States history: one, a liberal and pluralist tradition
assuring citizens that their private expectations and dealings would be
protected; and, second, a republican tradition giving citizens an op-
portunity to articulate "public values" that guide private conduct and
express the moral dimension of our polity. Cass Sunstein goes one
step further than Ackerman and argues that the historical evidence
supports the view that the republican tradition is the dominant tradi-
tion and that public values should inform legislation (and its imple-
mentation) at all levels. 79 In short, mounting historical evidence
indicates that pluralism is not part of the "original bargain" of the
Constitution. If pluralism is to be the basis for our government, it
must be justified politically.
The historical evidence adduced by Ackerman and Sunstein has
been accompanied by a powerful analytical attack on pluralism. As a
descriptive matter, scholars such as Ackerman and Jerry Mashaw ar-
gue that many statutes cannot be explained as mere deals between
private groups and the legislature.80 For example, public choice the-
ory is a poor explanation for the civil rights revolution in legislation
during the 1960's: although opposition to such legislation was both
well-organized and intense, substantive change was not only accom-
plished by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but that first major statute trig-
gered a wide-ranging wave of related statutes which have transformed
American values. Similarly, the environmental protection statutes of
the late 1960's and early 1970's and the deregulation of the late 1970's
are better explained by public-seeking theories of politics than by in-
78. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
79. See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). See
also Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv.
127.
80. See J. Mashaw, supra note 36, at 44-51; Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985);
Farber & Frickey, supra note 36. See also J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC
POLICIES (1984) (political science theory rejecting the private-seeking explanations of public choice
theory).
[Vol. 48:691
HeinOnline  -- 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 718 1986-1987
LEGISLATION SCHOLARSHIP AND PEDAGOGY
terest group theory. Perhaps the typical process of statute-creation-
or evolution-is one which is more "public-regarding" than public
choice theory has assumed.
As a normative matter, new legal process scholars tend to view
pluralism as an unworthy vision of our polity and to endorse a trans-
forming role for law. The republican tradition has suggested that law-
making ought to be viewed as an ongoing constitutive activity. Frank
Michelman's recent article on modem republicanism sets forth a posi-
tive vision of "freedom as self-government. ' 81 Inspired by Robert
Cover's notion of a "paideic community" formed by strong interper-
sonal bonding through our shared commitment to a specific moral
tradition and its ongoing elaboration, Michelman envisions law as a
process by which we actualize our potential, which can only be done
through a process of community discussion. His republican col-
league, Sunstein, argues that our interests (which he calls "prefer-
ences") are not exogenous to the political process; rather, they are
defined, in part, through the political process. Thus, legislation has
the power to transform private preferences, and it is wrong to accept
preferences as the inevitable starting point for lawmaking (as plural-
ism typically does).82 Preferences derived from existing legal rules or
from motivational distortions are two examples Sunstein invokes to
argue for the constitutive role of legislation.
The republican tradition has been a major philosophical impetus
for anti-pluralist discussion among new legal process scholars. Ron-
ald Dworkin has derived a similar anti-pluralist approach from mod-
em analytical philosophy. Dworkin distinguishes between a pluralist
"rulebook community," in which citizens generally agree to obey
rules created by the government, and a "community of principle," in
which citizens see themselves governed by basic principles, not just
political compromises.8 3 The latter is a worthier sense of community,
Dworkin argues, and legislation as well as adjudication must be evalu-
ated by its contribution to the principled integrity of the community.
Dworkin's vision of government is almost utopian in its rejection of
pluralist premises.
81. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 26, passim (1986). This important article appeared after we had written this
Article; hence, we have not given it the complete discussion it deserves.
82. See Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129 (1986).
See also Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. REv.
592, 617 (1985).
83. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 209-11 (1986).
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While advocating legislation which contributes to the common
good and transforms private preferences, new legal process thinkers
realize that the actual process of legislation often transforms private
preferences imperfectly. This recognition has generated theories to
justify activist judicial review. For example, a recent article by Ack-
erman both debunks and radicalizes traditional legal process justifica-
tions for judicial review. 84 Citing the celebrated footnote four of the
Carolene Products case, traditional legal process scholars have de-
fended judicial review as most appropriate when laws adversely affect
"discrete and insular minorities," who are likely to have been inade-
quately represented in the process of enactment.8 5 But Ackerman ar-
gues from public choice theory that discrete minorities are precisely
those which are most likely to form organized interest groups and,
hence, may sometimes be overrepresented in the political process.
Rather than discard the formula altogether, however, Ackerman sug-
gests that participatory protection be extended to other types of
groups that truly seem to have been denied access to the political pro-
cess, including groups that are discrete and diffuse (women), or anon-
ymous and somewhat insular (homosexuals), or both diffuse and
anonymous (victims of poverty). Moreover, Ackerman rejects the
traditional legal process vision of courts as simply a "perfecter of plu-
ralist democracy" and advocates an alternative vision in which courts
"are pluralism's ultimate critics. In exercising their critical function,
courts insist that there are certain substantive principles-Carolene
calls them 'prejudices'-that pluralist politicians are simply not al-
lowed to bargain over in normal American politics. '86
Like Ackerman, in order to ensure rationality and justice in law,
many other scholars are willing to abandon the notion that all polit-
ical choices must be made by the majoritarian legislature. Certain
critical "public values" simply cannot be bargained away, and much
of the process of political norm-creation must or should occur in the
courts.8 7 In an innovative twist on the majoritarian assumption, Rob-
ert Burt argues that some political controversies simply cannot be re-
solved in the majoritarian legislature, namely, those in which the
majority wants to purge or segregate a minority from the community.
In those cases, the best opportunity for a solution which saves the
84. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985).
85. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 22, relying on United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938).
86. Ackerman, supra note 84, at 741.
87. See generally M. PERRY, supra note 22; L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985).
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political community from itself is an active judicial scrutiny that
forces the legislature to justify its decision. 88
A growing body of scholarship focuses on ways, other than con-
stitutional judicial review of statutes, in which courts can, and should,
perform essentially "legislative" responsibilities. Like longstanding
legal process work, this body of scholarship analyzes or defends the
legitimacy of judicial lawmaking. Unlike prior legal process work,
new legal process scholarship proceeds in wide-ranging new direc-
tions, based upon a more open pessimism about the rationality of the
legislative process. For example, Guido Calabresi has taken one of
the key problems of statutory interpretation-how to apply an old
statute in radically new circumstances-and has suggested a novel
way of approaching it. He argues that courts ought to "overrule"
obsolescent statutes in the same manner they overrule obsolescent
common law precedents. 89 This thesis stands traditional legal process
theory on its head, but creatively argues from basic proceduralist and
rationality assumptions to make its case.
Other new legal process theorists have gone beyond the
proceduralist assumptions of traditional theory; they more explicitly
emphasize the demands of substantive justice and the evolutive rather
than formal nature of legitimacy. Like Calabresi, Ronald Dworkin
has dealt with the problem of aging statutes, and he argues that judges
can advance progressive social policy without imposing their own val-
ues onto statutes. 90 Unlike Calabresi and other new legal process
thinkers, Dworkin approaches the problem through a general theory
of law and strongly argues that there are "right" answers. In Dwor-
kin's ideal community of principle (noted above), "integrity in legisla-
tion" requires lawmakers to try to make the total set of laws morally
coherent. Like justice and fairness, integrity in the law contributes to
the coherence of the body politic, the moral community that bonds
the nation together. The courts' role is to interpret authoritative
88. See Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984).
89. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 2. Calabresi's thesis has stimulated an impressive commen-
tary. See, e.g., Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Law for a Statutory
Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (1982); Hutchinson & Morgan, Calabresian Sunset, supra note 73;
Lindgren & Schlegel, Thinking About Statutes: Hurst, Calabresi, Twining & Miers (Book Review),
1984 A.B. FOUND. REs. J. 458; Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography (Book Review), 96
HARV. L. REV. 534 (1982); Weisberg, supra note 10.
90. Dworkin does not inevitably fit into the legal process school of thought and might more
naturally be termed a "rights" theorist. Weisberg, supra note 10, treats him as a representative of
the new legal process, and we tentatively follow that lead because Dworkin's recent work on consti-
tutional and statutory interpretation fits the new legal process agenda to a substantial extent.
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statements of law (the Constitution, statutes, common law prece-
dents) in light of the underlying principles of the community. Thus,
in the "hard cases" of statutory interpretation, the best interpretation
is the one that is most consonant with the underlying values of society
and makes the statute the best statute it can be (within the limitations
imposed by the language).91
Dworkin's writings on statutory interpretation reject the con-
servative dimensions of traditional legal process doctrine, which has
often been invoked to bind courts to the original intent or purpose of
the enacting legislature. While traditional doctrine treats statutes as
static texts, Dworkin views statutes as "chain novels," in which each
interpretation of the statute changes it somewhat, and each new inter-
preter brings a new perspective to the statute.92 One of us has pur-
sued this anti-doctrinal theme to argue that historical legislative
expectations ought to have little persuasive value when societal or
legal circumstances have decisively changed. In such cases, courts
ought to interpret statutes "dynamically," that is, in light of current
policies and goals. 93
While Calabresi and Dworkin have tackled traditional legislation
issues to validate and defend innovative judicial lawmaking, Owen
Fiss has created an entirely new area of inquiry through his writings
on the "structural injunction."' 94 Structural injunctions are judicial
orders requiring public or private institutions to restructure them-
selves in order to achieve compliance with statutory or constitutional
standards. Structural injunctions are more like legislative statutes
than ordinary judicial orders. Like a statute, a structural injunction
typically affects the rights and obligations of groups (as in class ac-
tions); it is also an ongoing and sometimes virtually endless legal in-
struction to the regulated entities, and it sets forth imperative
commands. Fiss defends extensive use of structural injunctions on
grounds of justice. The values for which our society stands are de-
fined by what we do for the dispossessed-prisoners, mental patients,
91. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 83, at 313-54; Dworkin, Is There Really No Right Answer in
Hard Cases?, reprinted in R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119 (1985); Dworkin, How to
Read the Civil Rights Act, reprinted in id. at 316.
92. Dworkin's chain novel concept explicitly relies on the "Newer Criticism" in literary the-
ory. See Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982), reprinted in 9 CRIT. INQUIRY
179 (1982) and THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION (V. Mitchell ed. 1983); Dworkin, How Law is
Like Literature, reprinted in R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985).
93. See Eskridge, supra note 42.
94. See generally 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); 0. FISS, INJUNCTIONS ch.
3 (1973); 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS ch. 9 (2d ed. 1984).
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the homeless. Public choice theory, and everyday observation, indi-
cate that the legislature and the executive pay insufficient attention to
problems affecting marginalized groups such as these. Courts, on the
other hand, by their independence from interest group and other
political pressures and their professional commitment to rational
problem solving, are in a good position to attack structural institu-
tional problems and "to give meaning to our public values." 95 Thus,
through the use of structural injunctions, a court could ensure a jus-
tice that the legislature or executive would ignore.
What is striking about many new legal process thinkers is not
only their substantive commitment to progressive, fair, and just law,
but also their faith in the judicial process to contribute to such law.96
Other new legal process thinkers, though equally committed to sub-
stantive justice, would not rely exclusively on courts to carry on the
public dialogue. Progressive administrative law scholars such as
Mashaw and Richard Stewart start from the fact that most public law
in the United States today is made by bureaucrats, not judges. And
this is not necessarily bad, insofar as administrative law fosters a de-
liberative approach to agency lawmaking, for agencies have greater
resources and political leeway to achieve worthy public goals than
courts have.97 While courts should be available to monitor structural
problems, administrative innovation must come from within the exec-
utive, not the judicial, branch of government. Sunstein and Peter
Strauss, for example, have proposed an increase in the authority of
the Office of Management and Budget over the regulatory process as a
more effective way to assure that federal policies are carefully deliber-
ated and updated. 98
95. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979). See Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
96. Whereas Hart & Sacks wrote in a decade that was still somewhat suspicious of judicial
activism (the memory of the Four Horsemen who bedevilled the New Deal was still fresh), the new
legal process thinkers revere the era of the Supreme Court's civil rights activism. The "negative
example" of the 1950's was the Supreme Court's nostalgic decisions in Lochner and Debs, both
ultimately overridden by progressive legislation. In contrast, the negative example of the 1980's is
the reactionary legislative resistance to desegregation, ultimately overridden by judicial activism and
legislative support for that activism.
97. See J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 11-20, passim (1983); Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1711-90 (1975); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative
Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256 (1981). See also J. MASHAW & R. MER-
RILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM (2d ed. 1985).
98. See Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38
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A central dilemma addressed by new legal process thinkers is the
tension between their aspiration that law be positive, public-seeking,
and coherent and their realization that legislated law typically falls
short of this aspiration. This dilemma raises the countermajoritarian
difficulty once more, since new legal process thinkers favor expansive
lawmaking roles for judges and agencies. Unlike traditional legal pro-
cess thinkers, however, they readily admit that judicial and adminis-
trative law is more than interstitial. The new legal process response to
the countermajoritarian difficulty is to minimize its importance by re-
thinking the nature of lawmaking. Their reconceptualization rejects a
view of lawmaking as a series of one-shot declarations of rules and,
instead, sees lawmaking as a dialectic and evolutive process. Many of
the new legal process thinkers embrace the idea that law is the rules
that evolve from the norms accepted by the interpretive community.
Lawmaking is a continuous process of discussion, punctuated perhaps
by the enactment and interpretation of statutes but mainly animated
by an ongoing dialogue of interested and informed observers. The
legitimacy of law derives not from its formal source, but rather from
its capacity for enlightening us and advancing the moral and eco-
nomic dialectic of our society. Law is conversation rather than
coercion. 99
Different conceptions of the justification for legal authority fun-
damentally divide the different schools of legisprudence. Hart &
Sacks apparently accepted "positive law" theory-the law created by
the duly constituted institutions must be obeyed-but tried to make
the legal process seem "reasonable" and consistent with natural law
and subject to some ameliorating judicial freedom. Law and econom-
ics scholars and critical scholars have argued that Hart & Sacks' posi-
tion is incoherent because of its ambivalence. By refusing to rest the
legitimacy of law completely on either form or substance, traditional
legal process ends up justifying law that is neither formally legitimate
nor substantively just. Law and economics scholars generally accept
the positivist theory of law; their legisprudence is, on the whole, for-
malistic. Critical scholars generally accept a natural law theory (law
is only justified by its social justice); their legisprudence is, on the
ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 188-94 (1986); Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons
Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 292-95 (1986).
99. This point is made in Tushnet, supra note 77, at 1521. For examples of this tendency in
new legal process thought, see, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984); B.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Burt, supra note 88; Cover, Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Fiss, supra note 95.
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whole, anti-formalistic. New legal process scholars are torn between
formalism and anti-formalism. On the one hand, they view the law as
dynamic, moral, and answerable to the community. On the other
hand, they tend to view the community rather narrowly (perhaps lim-
ited to legal interpreters) and justify their approaches according to the
conventions of the legal world.100 In other words, their vision of the
law is a carefully defined natural law vision, but their justifications
appeal to a profession which believes that legal authority is ultimately
rooted in positivism.
III. POST-LEGAL PROCESS LEGISLATION PEDAGOGY
Overall, the post-legal process era has presented legislation schol-
ars with three challenges: first, to reexamine some of the assumptions
traditionally made about the legislative and political process; second,
to rethink much of the legal process doctrine of statutory interpreta-
tion and judicial review; and, third, to expand the academic inquiry to
include topics such as direct democracy, the nature of representation,
statutory obsolescence, the evolution of statutory schemes over time,
the choice of enforcement schemes, and so forth. The post-legal pro-
cess era has likewise presented a pedagogical challenge to legislation
scholars. This pedagogical challenge is to present at least some of the
fruits of this scholarly effort to law students. As we have discovered
in talking with other legislation professors and in constructing our
own materials, the pedagogical challenge presents both exciting op-
portunities and frustrating problems.
The exciting opportunities derive both from approaching legisla-
tion from different perspectives and from rethinking legal doctrine.
For example, in the first chapter of our materials, we present students
with two different models of the legislative process: an interest group
model suggested by public choice theory and pluralist political philos-
ophy, and a public values model suggested by political science studies
and republican political philosophy. Students typically find these al-
ternatives to the legal process vision to be interesting ways to think
about legislation, and we use those models to examine and critique
traditional rules and doctrine throughout the book.10 1
100. For examples, see S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
(1985); Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985).
101. There are nine chapters in the book. They use the theoretical start of the first chapter to
examine structures of representation (chapter two), the relationship between statutory law and case
law (chapter three), judicial review (chapter four), implementation of statutes (chapter five), direct
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The problem confronting the law professor who wants to present
the post-legal process perspectives to law students is that the law pro-
fessor's old friend (and crutch), near-absolute reliance on the case
method, is often unsuitable. Whatever its virtues in other law school
courses, the case method cannot address some legislation topics at all
and skews the overall coverage of the course in favor of topics such as
statutory interpretation. In addition, the case method artificially nar-
rows what are, in our view, the most interesting legisprudential in-
quiries. Public choice theory, legal history, literary theory, critical
theory and philosophy, and political science studies of political insti-
tutions all deserve at least some serious consideration in assessing the
nature and role of statutes in our public law. The broad insights and
provocative challenges that lie outside the narrow ambit of judicial
decisions not only encourage students constantly to reevaluate legal
doctrine, but also should inform each student's reconstruction of her
own legisprudential outlook.
Deemphasizing cases in favor of other types of teaching materials
can be unnerving to both law students and their instructors. Some
students will not be interested in legal history, political science, juris-
prudence, and the like, while others may question the practical value
of studying abstract theory. Law professors may find the theoretical
materials provocative (or so we hope), but then may find themselves
unable to think of interesting ways to teach them. Whatever may be
its drawbacks, the case method is an easy way to teach because a case
offers an accessible, oftentimes interesting and amusing, context in
which to talk about legal reasoning. For these reasons, our experience
has been that legislation materials work best if, from the outset, they
stimulate student interest and build lawyering skills in an obvious
fashion. In short, theory must be presented in as concrete and acces-
sible way as possible.
After several experiments-many of which were quite unsuccess-
ful-we have settled on a basic format which combines provocative
theory and concrete interest. We have written a substantial amount
of text explicating the differing approaches to legislation in the post-
legal process era, because we believe that the options available in pub-
lic law theory are largely animated by different descriptions and be-
liefs about legislation. The most interesting inquiries cannot begin
until students have been exposed to these descriptive and normative
democracy (chapter six), statutory interpretation (chapter seven), legislative drafting (chapter eight),
and statutory obsolescence (chapter nine).
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possibilities, and that exposure necessarily entails explication of legal
and extralegal theory. Yet, because textual readings may not interest
the student, we have tried to keep the explanatory text as short as
possible and have carefully tailored it to three types of "concretizing
devices."
One concretizing device is case studies of statutes. Chapter one
of our materials traces the political and social background of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, its path through the legislative labyrinth, and the
dramatic personal and political struggle that finally led to enactment.
This case study has the great benefit of stimulating student interest in
the course. More important, the case study teaches students a lot
about legislative procedure, since the Civil Rights Act had to contend
with most of the barriers that have been placed in the legislative stee-
plechase. Most important, the case study provides a context that the
professor can use to explain and criticize the various models of the
legislative process that are explicated in chapter one. Such a discus-
sion can then segue into the only judicial decision we reproduce in the
chapter, United Steelworkers v. Weber,102 which involves the interpre-
tation of Title VII of the Act. Weber ties in with the case study and
provides an exciting context in which to discuss not only the different
visions of legislation, but also the way in which statutes might evolve
over time.
Our second concretizing device is judicial decisions, though we
do not use as many of them as other legislation materials have done.
We chose the cases in our book because of their pathbreaking nature,
stimulating or dramatic facts and issues, or ease in teaching. With
few exceptions, the cases are not the mere embodiment of rules and
doctrine; instead, they are designed to be discussion points, in which
the insights of the surrounding text can be used to criticize the meth-
odology or assumptions of the judicial authors. For example, chapter
two of our materials examines the structures of representation, briefly
presents the leading theories of representation, and relates the theories
of representation to the different visions of legislation explained in
chapter one. 103 The chapter then turns to practical legal issues, start-
ing with voting rights. We use two recent Supreme Court decisions to
102. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
103. For example, a pluralist vision of legislation would tend to see legislators as agents or
brokers who must be responsive to the interests of the electorate (or at least that part of the electo-
rate which is organized). The republican vision of legislation would tend to see legislators as leaders
of enlightened public opinion.
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focus the discussion: Mobile v. Bolden,1° involving minority vote di-
lution, and Davis v. Bandemer,105 involving partisan gerrymandering.
These cases involve exciting issues and interesting facts, but their
main value is to show how one's political theory assumptions affect
one's approach to these cases. For example, an adherent of the plu-
ralist vision of our polity would be more likely to tolerate some mi-
nority vote dilution than an adherent to the republican vision, because
the latter would be more concerned about unfairness in the represen-
tative process. The interconnection of the legal issues and political
theory offers a variety of rich classroom experiences, we believe. 10 6
Provocative, teachable cases can make the pedagogical task sub-
stantially easier and more satisfying. Some of the cases we use, such
as Weber, Moragne v. United States Marine Lines,10 7 and Flood v.
Kuhn,10 8 are well-known teaching delights because of their dramatic
facts and unconventional legal reasoning. Other, less notorious, cases
which have stimulated student interest and amusement answer such
questions as:
" Whether a state law allowing only grocery stores of small size or
run by a family to remain open on Sundays is constitutional.10 9
O Whether a municipal gay rights ordinance can be repealed by a
popular initiative. 11°
° Whether a statute outlawing the immigration of aliens under con-
tract to provide services has an unwritten exception for Christian
clergy. 111
" Whether a statute requiring penalty payments to seamen dis-
charged without cause justifies an award of over $300,000 when
the employer wrongfully refused to pay $412 in back wages and
the seaman promptly found work elsewhere.1 12
O Whether an Alaska lands statute creates an easement across fed-
eral wilderness lands in Montana. 113
O Whether a tomato is a fruit or a vegetable for purposes of a tariff
104. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
105. 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986).
106. The remainder of chapter two uses a similar heuristic technique to assess some of the
important pressures on the representative system-lobbying, bribery, and campaign finance-as well
as the legal response to those pressures.
107. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
108. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
109. See Goodman v. Kennedy, 459 Pa. 313, 329 A.2d 224 (1974).
110. See St. Paul Citizens for Human Rights v. City Council of St. Paul, 289 N.W.2d 402
(Minn. 1979).
Ill. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
112. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
113. See Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981)
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schedule. 114
The results reached by courts in several of these cases are surprising
and should provoke wonderful student discussions.
The third main concretizing device we use is problems, which are
normally found at the end of each section of each chapter. Problems
can substitute for judicial decisions when there are no good cases from
which to teach. For example, in chapter two, we reproduce federal
statutes and Senate rules which regulate lobbying activity.1 5 Unfor-
tunately, there have been virtually no intelligible judicial decisions
making sense of these statutes, 1 6 so we offer a series of problems in
which students must decide what conduct is permitted, and what re-
porting must be done for permitted conduct. The problems are not
exceedingly difficult (and the teacher's manual will suggest the an-
swers we should reach), but they teach students the importance of
reading statutes carefully and the necessity of sometimes drawing
more coherence out of a statutory scheme than the legislature has put
into it.
Other legislation teachers will, we are sure, find other concretiz-
ing devices successful as well. One potentially valuable strategy is to
incorporate legislative drafting into the course.117 Our materials have
only a short treatment of legislative drafting because it is a topic de-
serving a full course and is the subject of excellent materials devel-
oped by Reed Dickerson. 18 Similarly, legislative internships give
students hands-on experience with legislation and would complement
our more theoretical course. Guest lectures by, or panel discussions
including, legislators, their staff, or lobbyists can reinforce the norma-
tive and descriptive lessons of legislation theory. Computer-assisted
instruction could be an effective-and even fun-way of teaching leg-
islative procedure and perhaps other topics, without spending much
(superseding earlier unpublished opinion which we also include in the materials), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 989 (1982).
114. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
115. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1982); Ethics in Government
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.,
5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 39 U.S.C.); Standing Rules of the Senate, Rules 35, 37-38 (1981).
116. In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the Supreme Court made a mess out of
federal lobbying law. We reproduce the Court's decision because it is an integral part of the law and
because law professors enjoy making sport of the Court's confused effort.
117. Alex Aleinikoff has developed drafting exercises which he used with our legislation mater-
ials, and in our published version of the materials we shall borrow some of his ideas.
118. See R. DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (2d ed. 1986) (treatise);
R. DICKERSON, MATERIALS ON LEGAL DRAFTING (1981) (classroom materials).
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class time on the subject. Student observation of legislative debates or
committee hearings could also be interesting and useful. 119
Our basic pedagogical strategy reflects the approaches that many
of our colleagues and we have found to be successful with students
and to be intellectually stimulating to scholars in this new post-legal
process era.120  By venturing beyond the traditional method, this
strategy allows us to address some topics not traditionally found in
legislation courses: minority vote dilution and the debate over pro-
portional representation; arguments suggested by law and economics,
critical, and new legal process scholars favoring more stringent judi-
cial review of statutes; direct democracy as an alternative to represen-
tative government; and the various techniques available to
legislatures, agencies, and judges to deal with aging statutes.12 1 Of
course, our materials also cover in some detail the topics that are tra-
ditionally examined in a legislation course, but we believe that the
theoretical perspective of the materials makes these topics more inter-
esting and accessible to students.
In particular, we believe that statutory interpretation, the most
traditional legislation topic of all, should be informed by broad theory
and infused with intellectual enthusiasm. Statutory interpretation is
potentially as dry as dust, an argument over words. But it is also
potentially very exciting, and we have tried to make it so. At the
beginning of our chapter on interpretation, we develop three different
contextual approaches to statutory interpretation: the traditional
legal process purpose-of-the-statute approach; Judge Posner's imagi-
native reconstruction of original intent; and the models of dynamic
interpretation in which the statute's meaning changes over time. This
alone shows students that more is at stake in statutory interpretation
than just word-crunching and that, depending upon their perspec-
tives, different interpreters will reach very different results. The re-
119. The Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) televises such debates and hearings
in Congress. Comparing a C-SPAN video-taped debate or hearing with the published record would
highlight, with more force than any secondary description could do, the inadequacies of the Con-
gressional Record and printed committee hearings as an authoritative source of federal legislative
history.
120. Among the past and present teachers of legislation with whom we have discussed such
issues are Alex Aleinikoff, Ann Bateson, Marsha Cohen, Mike Fitts, Bill Luneburg, Burke Marshall,
Richard Posner, Robert Weisberg, and Robert Williams.
121. While we think all these topics are fascinating, we do not advise trying to cover all of
them in one course. We believe that there should be at least two legislation courses in the law school
curriculum-one covering the political process and the other dealing with statutory interpretation
and related issues.
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mainder of the long chapter explores the various rules of statutory
interpretation in light of the new legisprudential debates. In the pro-
cess, students learn a lot of useful doctrinal information. More im-
portantly, they learn some judgment. In the real world of public law,
in which meaning is imported from a variety of contingent sources,
the most practical skill is also the most intellectual one: recognizing,
dealing with, and sculpting from legal uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
Our outline of the agenda for post-legal process legislation schol-
arship and pedagogy is hardly comprehensive. Yet it suggests that a
more systematic, legisprudential approach is needed to understand
current thinking about public law, and especially legislation. If the
assumptions of Hart & Sacks' synthesis are questionable on either
normative or empirical grounds, legal academics face the substantial
challenge of reconceptualizing important areas of law. That challenge
is all the more compelling because of the variety of approaches that
are strongly pressed. The academic enterprise demands that we seri-
ously consider the discordant theories of our colleagues, reexamine
heretofore-settled issues of the legal process, and attempt responsive
scholarship. Our students demand (or should demand) sophisticated
intellectual preparation for the legal world of competing assumptions
and ideologies. A general course in legislation-or, better yet, several
courses-ought to be an ideal opportunity for scholars and teachers to
develop and impart their insights in this uncertain new world beyond
legal process.
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